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	DEFENDANT'S REPLY ISO MOTION TO CONTINUE PRESENTENCING HEARING AND SENTENCING		

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The State's Objection improperly disregards the prosecution's constitutional obligations and treats important proceedings as mere formalities. The State's Objection also fails to extend the most basic courtesy to a respected member of the Prescott legal community. For the reasons stated in the opening motion, the failure to grant a reasonable continuance to accommodate Mr. Kelly's medical condition will needlessly create yet another appellate issue—one that could be avoided by a minimal extension of courtesy. The State's Objection also necessitates the following corrections and clarifications of fact and law:

First, the State grossly misconstrues the importance of Mr. Kelly's involvement at Mr. Ray's presentencing hearing and sentencing. The State notes that undersigned attorneys from Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP may be available next week to represent Mr. Ray, and cites an inapposite case involving attorneys from the same law firm as authority that the continuance should be denied. See State's Objection at 3, 6-7. This argument is misplaced in several respects. As an initial matter, as the Court has recognized, attorneys are not fungible. See Court Order, September 20, 2011, at 1 ("The Court agrees with the Defendant, of course, that attorneys are not 'fungible.'"). Furthermore, the availability of other competent counsel is not dispositive in the constitutional counsel-of-choice analysis. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) ("Deprivation of the right is "complete" when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of comparative effectiveness—with the right to effective counsel which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever lawyer is chosen or appointed."). Most importantly, Mr. Kelly is not a member of Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP. This issue would not arise if Mr. Li, Ms. Do, or Ms. Seifter became unavailable. Mr. Kelly is <u>local counsel</u>—the attorney familiar with county practices and steeped in community values. For that reason, he is Mr. Ray's counsel of choice for sentencing. The Court has already acknowledged that this preference warrants deference. See Order at 1 ("[D]eference should be accorded to the Defendant's and the defense team's preferences in determining the specific triallevel assignments of various counsel. This is true regardless of the number of attorneys who work

on a case. As was also noted by the Defendant, Mr. Kelly is local counsel, and that status, in itself, is an important consideration."). And the federal and Arizona Constitutions protect this preference, conferring a counsel-of-choice right that cannot lightly be abrogated in the name of scheduling concerns.

Second, the State misstates the record in several respects. The Court's order vacating the original sentencing date was not a delay caused by the Defense. Cf. State's Objection at 5. As the Court is aware, the Presentence Report was not yet completed at that time. With regard to other delays alleged by the State, the record of the July 29, 2011 sentencing hearing must speak for itself.

Third, the State asserts, in a bare sentence, that "[s]entencing in this matter is not complex and should proceed forthwith." State's Objection at 7. This assertion is inappropriate and incorrect. It should go without saying that sentencing is an absolutely critical phase of this criminal proceeding. It is the moment that most directly affects Mr. Ray's liberty and constitutional rights. Mr. Ray's right to counsel of choice is *at its height* during sentencing.

Fourth, the State suggests that "the release to work by [Mr. Kelly's] doctor of September 26 is two days before the rescheduled hearing will resume, effectively giving Mr. Kelly additional time to prepare." State's Objection at 7. This is incorrect. As set forth in Mr. Kelly's affidavit, filed with the Court yesterday, Mr. Kelly is being evaluated today and does not yet have a "release to work."

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1 2 3	DATED: September 22, 2011	MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP BRAD D. BRIAN LUIS LI TRUC T. DO MIRIAM L. SEIFTER
4		THOMAS K. KELLY
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6		By: KK
7		Attorneys for Defendant James Arthur Ray
8	and a second	
9	Copy of the foregoing delivered this day of September, 2011, to:	
10	Sheila Polk	
11	Yavapai County Attorney Prescott, Arizona 86301	
12	by 28 K & 00 P	
13	by SS Mello	
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